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Abstract
This paper completely characterizes the set of Nash equilibria of the Vickrey
auction for multiple identical units when buyers have non-increasing marginal
valuations and there at least three potential buyers. There are two types of equi-
libria: In the first class of equilibria there are positive bids below the maximum
valuation. In this class, above a threshold value all bidders bid truthfully on all
units. One of the bidders bids at the threshold for any unit for which his valuation
is below the threshold; the other bidders bid zero in this range. In the second
class of equilibria there are as many bids at or above the maximum valuation as
there are units. The allocation of these bids is arbitrary across bidders. All the
remaining bids equal zero. With any positive reserve price equilibrium becomes
unique: Bidders bid truthfully on all units for which their valuation exceeds the
reserve price. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D44.
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1 Introduction
This paper completely characterizes the set of Nash equilibria of the Vickrey auction for multiple
identical units when buyers have non-increasing marginal valuations and there are at least three
potential buyers. Equilibria fall into two classes: In one class there is positive probability that
there are positive bids below the maximum valuation. In this class, there is a threshold for
valuations such that all bidders bid truthfully on any unit for which they have a valuation
exceeding the threshold. Furthermore, there is a distinct bidder who bids the threshold value on
any unit for which his valuation is below the threshold. The remaining bidders bid zero on any
unit for which their valuation is below the threshold. In the other class of equilibria, there are no
positive bids below the highest valuation. In this class, each bidder bids at or above the highest
valuation on some number of units and bids zero on the remaining units in such a manner that
the total number of positive bids across all bidders equals the number of units that are for sale.
In any equilibrium, except the conventional equilibrium in dominant strategies, there is positive
probability that a bidder wins a unit at a price of zero. In this sense all of these equilibria are
collusive.
We also observe that all equilibria of the Vickrey auction are ex-post equilibria, i.e. bidders
have no incentive to change their behavior even after all private information is revealed and
therefore suffer no regret. Indeed, the entire set of equilibria within the first class remain
equilibria for any change of the distribution function of bidders’ valuations, including changes
that affect the support of the distribution of bidders’ valuations.
With any positive reserve price equilibrium becomes unique: Bidders bid truthfully on all
units for which their valuation exceeds the reserve price. From this perspective, our result
can be interpreted as providing an alternative foundation for the focus on the truthful-bidding
equilibrium.
Vickrey [1961] introduced the second-price sealed-bid auction for both the single- and the
multiple-object case. With private values, there is a unique equilibrium in undominated strate-
gies: Bidders bid their valuations. Milgrom [1981] notes the existence of other (asymmetric)
equilibria in the single-unit case. For two bidders, Plum [1992] describes yet more equilibria
in the single-unit case. Blume and Heidhues [2004] characterize all equilibria of the single-unit
Vickrey auction with independent private values and three or more bidders. Blume and Heid-
hues [2001] also cover the two-bidder case. Tan and Yilankaya [forthcoming] show the existence
of asymmetric equilibria with participation costs that are undominated. In contrast to these
papers, here we consider the more complex multi-unit case.
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2 Setup
There are n bidders indexed by i = 1, . . . , n, and m identical units j = 1, . . . ,m. Bidder i’s
vector of valuations is denoted vi =
(
vi1, . . . , v
i
m
)
, where vij represents the marginal valuations
of the j-th unit. Thus the value of obtaining j units is
∑j
k=1 v
i
k. We assume marginal valuations
to be non-increasing, i.e. vij ≥ vij+1, for all j = 1, . . . ,m− 1. Each bidder i’s valuation vector is
independently drawn from some full support distribution Fi on the set V := {vi ∈ [0, vh]m|vij ≥
vij+1, ∀j = 1, . . . ,m− 1}.
The auctions rules are as follows: Each bidder i submits a bid vector bi = (bi1, . . . , b
i
m) ∈
B := {bi ∈ Rm+ |bij ≥ bij+1,∀j = 1, . . . ,m − 1} independently from and simultaneously with the
other bidders. Restricting bid vectors to belong to the set B is without loss of generality. It
simply expresses that bids in any bid vector are automatically ranked from highest to lowest, and
permits us to talk about “a bidder’s bid on his first, second, . . . unit.” The auctioneer collects all
bidders’ bids and ranks them from the highest to the lowest bid, breaking ties by choosing with
equal probability among all possible rankings among tying bids. Each bidder receives a unit for
each of his bids that is among the m highest ranked bids. If bidder i wins ki units, then he pays
the ki highest losing bids among his rivals. Formally, define c−i as the vector consisting of the
m highest bids submitted by bidders other than bidder i, ordered so that c−i1 ≥ . . . ≥ c−im . A
bidder who gains ki units pays
∑ki
k=1 c
−i
m−ki+k.
A bid function bi(·) : V → B for bidder i maps valuation vectors into bid vectors. We denote
a strategy profile by b(·).
3 Examples
In order to illustrate the panoply of equilibria that are possible with only two bidders, to under-
stand the role of limiting attention to the case with three or more bidders, and to get intuition
for the proof of our characterization result, here we briefly discuss a few simple examples.
In Figure 1, we represent the essential aspects of one (type of) equilibrium in an auction
with two bidders and two items for sale. Some features of this example survive when we restrict
attention to three or more bidders, others do not. The two panels on top represent bidder one’s
bid function. Bidder two’s bid function is shown in the bottom two panels. In this equilibrium
bidder i’s bid on his first (second) unit depends only on the higher (lower) of his two valuations.
This feature, that a bidder’s bid on his jth unit is independent of his valuation for his other
units will be a general characteristic of all equilibria in which there is a positive probability of
positive bids below the maximum valuation.
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Figure 1
Bidder 1 bids b∗1 on his first unit provided his high valuation satisfies v11 ≤ b∗1. Otherwise, he
bids truthfully on his first unit. Since bidder 1 bids above his valuation on his first unit whenever
he does not bid truthfully on that unit, we refer to him as a high bidder on his first unit. Bidder
1 bids zero on his second unit whenever his low valuation satisfies v12 ≤ b∗2. Otherwise, he
bids truthfully on his second unit. Since bidder 1 bids below his valuation on his second unit
whenever he does not bid truthfully on that unit, we refer to him as a low bidder on his second
unit.
In the example, each bidder is a high bidder on his first unit and a low bidder on his second
unit. We will find that having multiple high bidders is possible with more than two bidders only
if the probability of positive bids below the maximum valuation is zero.
Observe also that in the example the critical value b∗i at which bidder i switches from bidding
above his valuation to bidding truthfully on his first unit, differs across the two bidders. Again,
this cannot occur with three or more bidders. With three or more bidders, if there is positive
probability of positive bids below the maximum valuation, an equilibrium with distinct threshold
values (b∗1 and b∗2) as in Figure 1 is ruled out. To understand this, notice that a third bidder
3
facing bidding behavior by the other two bidders as in Figure 1 would want to bid truthfully
on his first unit for valuations above b∗2. But with two bidders bidding truthfully on their first
unit above b∗1, it is no longer optimal for bidder 1 to maintain his postulated bidding strategy
on the first unit.
This, in a nutshell, is the contagion effect that drives much of our result: If some bidder in
a putative equilibrium puts in positive bids below the maximum valuation on some unit, e.g.
bidder 1 bids near b∗2 on his second unit, then for any other bidder, say bidder 2, who competes
for that unit, those bids become potential prices. This disciplines this bidder’s bidding behavior
on that unit (viz. bidder 2 does not overbid on his first unit for valuations above b∗2). With three
or more bidders in the auction, this discipline extends to at least two bidders. As a consequence
the discipline extends to other units. In the example, with three bidders, it is no longer optimal
for bidder 1 to overbid on his first unit for valuations for that unit in [b∗2, b∗1].
A further possibility for equilibria in the two-bidder case, which generalizes the example of
Figure 1, is that bidders have multiple gaps in their bid function, bidding truthfully outside
the gaps, and adopting complementary roles of high and low bidders over the gaps. Here bidder
one’s gaps in his bid function for his first unit match bidder two’s gaps in his bid function for his
second unit, and vice versa. Any number and (matching) placement of gaps is possible. With
three or more bidders all equilibria of this form disappear. The reason is that if two bidders
have bid functions with gaps of this form, the third bidder has an incentive to bid inside these
gaps. As a consequence, the bid functions with gaps are no longer optimal.
4 Results
We have two principal results that jointly characterize the entire set of Nash equilibria of the
multi-unit Vickrey auction with three or more bidders. Our first result describes all Nash
equilibria in which there is positive probability of positive bids below the maximum valuation;
i.e., there exists at least one bidder i for whom bij(v
i) ∈ (0, vh) for at least one item j. We show
that in this class of equilibria, there is a critical value b∗ such that every bidder i bids truthfully
on any unit j for which vij ≥ b∗. Furthermore, there is a single high bidder iˆ who bids b∗ on
any unit j for which viˆj ≤ b∗. The remaining bidders will be referred to as low bidders. Any low
bidder i bids zero on any unit j for which vij ≤ b∗. It is important to emphasize that the high
bidder is unique and that the critical value b∗ is the same for all units. All proofs are in the
Appendix.
Proposition 1 Let the number of bidders satisfy n ≥ 3. Suppose that bij
(
vi
) ∈ (0, vh) with
positive probability for some bidder i and unit j. Then b (·) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
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there is a bidder ıˆ and some b∗ ∈ (0, vh) such that
bıˆj
(
vıˆ
)
=
{
vıˆj if v
ıˆ
j ≥ b∗
b∗ otherwise
for all j = 1, ...,m and almost all vıˆ, and
bij
(
vi
)
=
{
vij if v
i
j ≥ b∗
0 otherwise
for all i 6= ıˆ, all j = 1, ...,m and almost all vi.
To check that these strategies are equilibria it suffices to verify that no player can gain by
deviating and playing his dominant strategy. First, consider the low bidders. For valuations
above b∗, these bidders bid their valuation anyhow. In case the valuation for some unit j is
below b∗, these bidders bid zero for this unit and do not obtain it. Raising such bids to their
true valuation vij < b
∗, does not increase the probability of obtaining the object, since the mth
highest bid is at b∗ or above. Thus low bidders are playing a best response to the strategy of
the high bidder. Similarly, suppose the high bidder has a valuation for object j below b∗. In
equilibrium, with probability one, he only obtains the object if the m − j + 1-th highest rival
bid is zero, and thus pays a price of zero. Thus, lowering his bid to his valuation neither affects
the probability with which he obtains the object nor the price. Again therefore, he plays a best
response.
For the converse result, the key observation is that if a bidder bids at or near some interior
value b∗ with positive probability, this induces a contagion process with the result that all bidders
bid their true value above b∗ for all units. Suppose bidder 1 bids at or near b∗. Then this bid
must sometimes win as otherwise there would be a bidder who would obtain the object also
when he has valuations below b∗ for all units. This bidder would gain by switching to bidding
his valuation on all units. Now consider bidder 2 and hold the behavior of all bidders other
than bidder 1 and 2 fixed. There exists at least one unit for which bidder 2 competes directly
with bidder 1’s bid b∗, in the sense that by bidding slightly above b∗ rather than below, bidder
2 increases the probability of obtaining that unit. As this is true for all bidders other than 1, all
bidders sometimes bid at or above b∗. Hence there are both potentially many bids above as well
as below b∗, which induces bidder 1 to bid at or above b∗ for many units, which in turn induces
other bidders to bid at or above b∗ for many units. This contagion process continues until all
bidders bid their valuation for all values above b∗.
We are left to consider the case in which no bidder bids in the interior.
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Proposition 2 Let the number of bidders satisfy n ≥ 3. Suppose that in equilibrium bij
(
vi
) ∈(
0, vh
)
with probability zero for all bidders i and units j. Then either bij
(
vi
)
= 0 for almost all
vi, or bij
(
vi
) ≥ vh for almost all vi. Furthermore,
#
{
(i, j)
∣∣∣bij (vi) ≥ vh for almost all vi} = m.
To see that the above strategy profile is an equilibrium, observe that any bidder who submits
a positive bid for some unit, obtains that unit for free. Thus, submitting any positive bid on
these units is part of a best response. Furthermore, the only way a bidder could increase the
number of objects he obtains with positive probability is to bid at or above the highest possible
valuation for some additional unit(s). For each unit he would obtain over and above the ones he
gets in equilibrium, his payment increases by at least the highest possible valuation vh. Thus
deviating is unprofitable. The converse statement is established in the Appendix.
We conclude with considering the robustness of the Nash equilibria of the Vickrey auction.
Four types of robustness are considered, robustness against varying the type distribution on a
fixed payoff-type space, robustness against removing bidders, robustness against adding bidders
with a larger set of payoff types, and robustness against introducing a positive reserve price. We
find that the last of the four tests is the most stringent.
Remark 1 All equilibria of the Vickrey auction are ex-post equilibria.
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a Bayesian game is an ex-post equilibrium if players’ strate-
gies remain optimal even if all private information is made public. This condition clearly holds
for all equilibria in Propositions 1 and 2, and thus for all equilibria of the Vickrey auction. In
an ex-post equilibrium agents will never have to face regret. Furthermore, these equilibria are
robust in the sense that they are invariant to changes of the distribution of player’s private
information (on a given type space).
The asymmetric equilibria are not, however, ex post in the sense of Holzman and Monderer
(2004). They require what they refer to as “ex-post equilibria in Vickrey-Clarke Groves mecha-
nisms” to remain equilibria when an arbitrary subset of players is excluded from playing. In the
asymmetric equilibria of Proposition 1, if the high bidder is excluded, the remaining low bid-
ders who bid zero would have a positive probability of obtaining the object when bidding zero.
Thus, once the high bidder is taken out, low bidders gain from bidding their true valuations.
As Holzman and Monderer show, their notion of “ex post equilibria in Vickrey-Clarke Groves
mechanisms” requires player to use symmetric strategies. In our setting, this simplifies to the
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unique weakly dominant strategy profile. If, however, the high bidder is known to be active, our
asymmetric equilibria of Proposition 1 are robust to adding or excluding low bidders.
Remark 2 All equilibria of Proposition 1 are robust to enlarging the type space by including
bidders with higher valuations than vh.
The equilibria of Proposition 1 are not only robust to changing the distribution over a given
payoff-type space but also allow arbitrary extensions of the type space to bidders with possibly
higher valuations.1 This is not the case with the equilibria of Proposition 2. Indeed, only if there
is a single high bidder who bids at vh for all units is it possible to prescribe equilibrium bidding
behavior for the new types (i.e. bid their valuation) without changing the bidding behavior of
existing types.
Suppose the auctioneer sets a positive reserve price r > 0, such that for any unit a bidder
obtains, his bid has to be at least as high as the reserve price and the reserve price is the
minimum price for any unit. Without loss of generality, we can identify bids below the reserve
price, or not bidding, with bidding zero. If m′ is the number of bids at or above r, the auctioneer
hands out µ = min{m′,m} units to the bidders with the µ highest bids. A bidder who gains ki
units pays
∑ki
k=1max
{
c−im−ki+k, r
}
.
A positive reserve price below the maximum valuation has the same contagious effect as
having bids with positive probability in that range. Bidders with valuations below the reserve
price will refrain from bidding above the reserve price, for fear of winning an item at a price
above their valuation for that item. As a consequence, any bidder will put in a bid above
the reserve price for any item for which his valuation exceeds the reserve price. Bidders with
valuations between those bids and the reserve price will want to bid in that range. With three
or more bidders, this eliminates any potential gaps in the bid function above the reserve price,
and therefore bidders bid truthfully for any unit with a valuation above the reserve price. The
details of the proof are virtually identical to that of Proposition 1 and therefore omitted.
Corollary 1 With a positive reserve price r > 0, equilibrium is unique: Bidders refrain from
bidding on any unit for which their valuation is less than the reserve price. Otherwise they bid
their valuation.
1With free disposal, zero is a natural lower bound on possible types.
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5 Appendix: Proofs
We begin by establishing the contagion property that is central to obtaining the characterization
result.
Lemma 1 Suppose that for some bidder i, some unit j, some c ∈ (0, vh) and all  > 0 there
is positive probability that bij ∈ [c, c + ). Then blk(vl) = vlk for (almost) all vlk ∈ (c, vh), all
l = 1, . . . , n, and all k = 1, . . . ,m; i.e., every bidder bids truthfully on every unit for which his
valuation exceeds c.
Proof: Since the argument is somewhat lengthy and for readability the proof will be presented
in a series of steps. The property that is established in each step will be highlighted by italics.
Step 1. Whenever bij ≥ c, bidder i wins at least j units with positive probability. Otherwise,
there is probability one that at least m − j + 1 bids made by bidders other than i are above
c. But this cannot be because then one of these bidders, say bidder l, with positive probability
would win kl > 0 units and pay more than his value for his klth unit.
Step 2. If bidder l1 6= i has m − j + 1 or more valuations above c, then he has at least one
bid above c, by Step 1. If conditional on bidder l1 having one bid above c there is positive
probability that all bids bij ≥ c remain winning bids with positive probability for bidder i, and
bidder l1 has m− j + 1 or more valuations above c, then bidder l1 has at least two bids above
c. If on the other hand conditional on bidder l1 having one bid above c, for some η > 0 all bids
bij ∈ [c, c+ η) become losing bids with probability one, then there is probability one that there
are at least m− j other bids above c. Suppose these m− j bids are made by bidders other than
l1. This cannot be because then one bidder other than bidder l1, say bidder l, with positive
probability would win kl units and pay more than his value for his klth unit. Thus, again if
bidder l1 has m − j + 1 or more valuations above c, he will have at least two bids above c.
Iterating this argument, we conclude that if bidder l1 has m− j+1 or more valuations above c,
he will have at least m− j + 1 bids above c. Furthermore, from Step 1 it follows that if a bidder
l1 6= i has less than m− j +1 valuations above c, he will have no more than m− j bids above c.
Step 3. One implication of Step 2 is that there is positive probability that there are at least
m+ 1 bids at or above c made by bidders i and l1.
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A bidder l2 6= i, l1 cannot bid with probability one at or above vh for his first unit. If such a
bid wins in the event of m+ 1 or more positive bids by i and l1, then with positive probability
l2 pays more than his value for his first unit. If such a bid loses, then a bidder other than bidder
l2 would pay more than his value for at least one of his units.
Exchanging the roles of bidders in the above argument, it follows that with positive prob-
ability all bidders other than bidder i bid below vh on their first unit. Hence, with positive
probability bidder i’s bid on his last unit exceeds the highest bid of bidders other than i on
their first unit. The probability of bidder i’s bid on his mth unit being equal to or exceeding
vh, however, equals zero. Otherwise the bids of the other bidders on their first unit have to be
bounded away from vh. In that case, denote the supremum of first-unit bids by bidders other
than bidder i by b. Note (using Step 2) that vh > b > c > 0, and hence it follows from Step
1 that a bid at or above b wins at least one unit with positive probability. Then, if there is
a bidder l1 6= i whose distribution of first-unit bids has a mass point at b, the other bidders
have an incentive to bid above b on their first unit with positive probability. If there is no such
bidder, and wlog b is the supremum of first-unit bids by bidder l1 6= i, then there is a bidder
l2 6= i, l1 who with positive probability has an incentive to bid in the interval [b, vh), where we
use the requirement that his first-unit bids are bounded away from vh. If such bids are in the
interior of this interval with positive probability, we have a contradiction because this violates
the definition of b. Otherwise, we must have a mass point at b, which would take us back to the
earlier case.
Since bidder i’s bid on his mth unit is less than vh with positive probability, there is a bidder
other than bidder i who bids with positive probability in the interval (0, vh). Thus, from the
foregoing argument, with the role of bidders exchanged, it follows that with positive probability
all bidders bid below vh on their first unit. Hence, with positive probability all bidders bid above
zero on their last unit.
Step 4. Consider three distinct bidders l1, l2 and l3. Suppose bidder l1 bids with positive prob-
ability at or above vh on his first unit. Then the bids of bidder l2 on his last unit must be
bounded away from vh. Denote the corresponding least upper bound by bm. From Step 3, we
know that bm ∈ (0, vh). Then bidder l3 has an incentive to bid with positive probability at
or above bm on his first unit. If such bids with positive probability are below vh, we have a
contradiction because then bidder l2 would have an incentive to bid with positive probability
above bm on his last unit in violation of the definition of bm. Continue then with the case where
both bidders l1 and l3 with positive probability bid at or above vh on their first unit. Then the
9
bids of bidder l2 on his m− 1th unit must be bounded away from vh. Denote the corresponding
least upper bound by bm−1 and note that bm−1 ∈ [bm, vh). Then bidder l3 has an incentive to
bid with positive probability at or above bm−1 on his first two units. If in this case bidder l3’s
bids on his second unit are below vh with positive probability, we have a contradiction because
then bidder l2 would have an incentive to bid above bm−1 on his m − 1th unit. Continue then
with the case where bidder l1 bids with positive probability at or above vh on his first unit
and bidder l3 bids with positive probability at or above vh on his first two units. Iterating this
argument, we find that bidder l2’s bid on his first unit must be bounded away from vh. Denote
the corresponding least upper bound by b1 and note that 0 < bm ≤ bm−1 ≤ . . . ≤ b1 < vh. Then
bidder l3 has an incentive to bid with positive probability at or above b1 on all of his units. If
in this case bidder l3’s bids on his mth unit are below vh with positive probability, we have a
contradiction because then bidder l2 would have an incentive to bid above b1 on his first unit in
violation of the definition of b1. But at the same time, it is impossible for bidder l3 to bid with
positive probability at or above vh on all of his units because then with positive probability there
would be m+ 1 bids at or above vh and therefore at least one bidder with positive probability
would win an item at a price above his valuation for that item. Since the choice of the three
bidders was arbitrary, it follows that the probability that any bidder bids at or above vh on any
of his units is zero. Combined with the earlier observation that all bidders bid with positive
probability in (0, vh) on their last unit, this implies that all bidders bid with positive probability
in (0, vh) on all of their units.
Step 5. Pick an arbitrary pair of distinct bidders l1 and l2. Suppose bidder l1’s bids on his last
unit are bounded away from vh. Denote the corresponding least upper bound by h. From Step 4,
0 < h < vh and from Step 1, bids at or above h win at least one unit with positive probability.
Hence bidder l2 must bid with positive probability in [h, vh) on his first unit, as he cannot be
bidding at or above vh. This in turn implies that bidder l1 has an incentive to bid with positive
probability in (h, vh) on his last unit, contrary to the definition of h. Since the choice of bidders
was arbitrary, it follows that for all  > 0, there is positive probability that all bids of all bidders
are in the interval (vh − , vh).
Step 6. Suppose there is an interval (e, e′) ⊆ (c, vh) in which no bidder bids on his first unit with
positive probability. Then there is a maximal such interval (e, e) ⊆ (c, vh) by exactly the same
argument as in Lemma A3 of Blume and Heidhues [2004]. From Step 5, we know that e < vh
and that with positive probability every bidder bids in (e, vh) on all of his units.
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Denote the infimum of positive probability bids on any bidder’s last unit in the interval [e, vh]
by bm. Suppose that e < bm. Without loss of generality, suppose that e is the infimum of bidder
l1’s first unit bids in the interval [e, vh] and that bm is the infimum of bidder l2’s mth-unit bids
in the same interval. Then, if bidder l3 has all of his valuations in the interval (e, bm), he will
have all of his bids in the interval (e, bm]; this follows from Step 2. If in this case he bids with
positive probability in (e, bm) on his mth unit, we have the desired contradiction. Otherwise,
bidder l3 with positive probability bids at bm on his last unit. But then, if bidder l2 has all of
his valuations in the interval (e, bm) he will have all of his bids in the same interval, and we have
again reached a contradiction. We conclude that we must have e = bm.
Then take a bidder all of whose valuations are in (e, e) to derive a contradiction to the
assumption that no one bids with positive probability in (e, e) on his first unit. Distinguish the
cases where e = c and e > c :
Consider the case where e = c. Without loss of generality, suppose that e is the infimum of
bidder i1’s mth-unit bids in the interval [e, vh]. Then by Step 2 a bidder i2 other than i and i1
who has all of his valuations in the interval (c, e) has an incentive to bid on his first unit in the
interval (c, e]. If such bids are in the interval (c, e), we have the desired contradiction. Therefore,
suppose the distribution of bidder i2’s bids on his first unit when all of his valuations are in the
interval (c, e) has a mass point at e. Step 1 implies that the distribution of bidder i1’s bids on
his mth unit cannot have a mass point at e; otherwise bidder i2 with positive probability would
win a unit at a price above his valuation for that unit.
There are two cases to consider: First, if i1 = i, then for all bidders other than bidder i
their distributions of first-unit bids must have mass points at e. Second, if i1 6= i, then since
i1’s distribution of bids on his mth unit does not have a mass point at e, for any  > 0, there
is positive probability that bidder i bids in the interval (e, e + ) on all of his units. But this
implies that e is the infimum of bidder i’s bids on his last unit in the interval [e, vh]. Thus, in
either case all bidders other than bidder i must have a mass point at e in their distributions of
first-unit bids. But then, consider the case where bidder i has m − 1 valuations above e and
his mth valuation below e. Since with positive probability all of his rivals bid at e on their first
unit and there are at least two such rivals, i has to bid for m − 1 units above e to ensure that
he receives those units whenever their prices are below his values for those units. At the same
time, Step 2 implies that he will bid below e for his last unit. Let the remaining bidders all have
valuations below e such that they bid at e on their first unit. In this case there is a bidder with
valuation on his first unit below e, who wins one unit and pays e. Since this case has positive
probability, this gives the desired contradiction.
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Consider the case where e > c. Without loss of generality, suppose that e is the supremum of
bidder i1’s 1st-unit bids in the interval [c, e]. Similarly, without loss of generality suppose that e
is the infimum of bidder i2’s mth-unit bids in the interval [e, vh]. Then a bidder i3 other than i1
and i2 who has all of his valuations in the interval (e, e) has an incentive to bid on his first unit
in the interval [e, e]. If such bids are in the interval (e, e), we have the desired contradiction.
Therefore, suppose the distribution of bidder i3’s bids on his first unit has a mass point at
e. Note that the distribution of bidder i2’s bids on his mth unit cannot have a mass point at e;
otherwise bidder i3 with positive probability would win a unit at a price above his valuation for
that unit. There are two cases to consider:
First, consider i2 = i1. Then for all bidders other than bidder i1, their distributions of
first-unit bids must have mass points at either e and\or e. If there is no mass point at e, the
argument for the case e = c applies. If on the other hand, there is a bidder i4 other than i1 whose
distribution of first-unit bids has a mass point at e, then there is a bidder (other than i4 and
i1) who with positive probability prefers to bid in (e, e) on his last unit. But this implies that
bidder i4 sometimes wants to outbid this bidder with his first unit bid when all his valuations
are in the interval (e, e). Since, by assumption he is not bidding in the interior of this interval,
his distribution of first-unit bids must also have a mass point at e. Hence, all bidders other than
i1 must have distributions of first-unit bids with mass points at e.
Second, if i2 6= i1, then since i2’s distribution of bids on his mth unit does not have a mass
point at e, for any  > 0, there is positive probability that bidder i1 bids in the interval (e, e+ )
on all of his units. But this implies that e is the infimum of bidder i1’s bids on his last unit in
the interval [e, vh], which takes us back to the previous case. Thus, in either case all bidders
other than bidder i1 must have a mass point at e in their distributions of first-unit bids.
Now suppose there is no bidder, like i3 above, whose distribution of first-unit bids has a
mass-point at e. From the foregoing argument, it is without loss of generality to focus on the
case where i2 = i1. Then, for all bidders other than i1, their distribution of first-unit bids must
have a mass point at e. Then there are at least two bidders, which are different from i1, who
for a positive-probability set of values prefers to bid in the interval (e, e] on their mth unit. If
such bids with positive probability are in (e, e), then we get a contradiction because at least
one bidder other than i1 would have to have a mass point at e in his distribution of first-unit
bids. Hence, both bidders’ distribution of mth-unit bids must have a mass point at e, which is
impossible because then there would be positive probability that a bidder wins a unit at a price
above his valuation for this unit.
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Hence, we may conclude that in every interval above c there is some bidder who bids in this
interval with positive probability on his first unit.
Step 7. Suppose there is an interval (d, d′) ⊂ (c, vh) and a bidder l1 who does not bid with
positive probability in (d, d′) on his first unit. Then, by Step 2, bidder l1 must bid truthfully
on his mth unit over this interval. Then, using Step 2 once more, any bidder l2 6= l1 must
bid truthfully on his first unit over the same interval. Hence, any bidder l3 6= l1, l2 must bid
truthfully on both his first and his mth unit over (d, d′). But then bidder l1 must bid truthfully
on his first unit over the interval (d, d′), which leads to a contradiction. Therefore every bidder
bids with positive probability in every interval (d, d′) ⊂ (c, vh) on his first unit. Hence, every
bidder bids truthfully on his mth unit over the interval (c, vh). This implies that every bidder
bids truthfully on his first unit over the interval (c, vh).
Step 8. Suppose that for some bidder l and unit k, we have vlk ∈ (c, vh). Consider two bidders l1
and l2 different from bidder l. From Step 7, for any  > 0, there is positive probability that all of
bidder l1’s bids are in the interval (vlk − , vlk) and that all of bidder l2’s bids are in the interval
(vlk, v
l
k + ). Thus, if bidder l were to bid below v
l
k − , he would run the risk of not winning his
kth unit when it is available at a price below his valuation for that unit. Similarly, if bidder
l were to bid above vlk + , he would run the risk of winning a kth unit at a price exceeding
his valuation for that unit. Therefore, for any valuation vlk ∈ (c, vh), it is uniquely optimal for
bidder l to bid truthfully on his kth unit. 
We are ready to prove Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 1: We have established that all such strategy profiles are Nash equilibria
in the text. We are left to show that no other equilibrium exists in which some bidder bids in
(0, vh) with positive probability.
Suppose that bij
(
vi
) ∈ (0, vh) with positive probability for some bidder i and unit j. Let
b∗ := inf
{
b ∈ (0, vh)|∃i, j s.t. ∀ > 0,Pr{bij ∈ [b, b+ )} > 0} .
For almost all vij > b
∗, bidders bid truthfully by Lemma 1, i.e. bij(v
i) = vij . If b
∗ = 0, we are
done.
Thus consider the case where b∗ > 0. Whenever a bidder has his valuation for a unit in
(0, b∗) , then he bids in [0, b∗] for this unit; otherwise, by Lemma 2 there would be positive
probability of this bidder winning a unit at a price above his valuation for that unit. Trivially,
such bids cannot be in (0, b∗) .
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Suppose there are two distinct bidders l1 and l2 (and possibly others) who with positive
probability submit a bid b∗ on their first unit. Then there exists a bidder l3 6= l1, l2 who bids,
with positive probability, for exactly m − 1 units above b∗ and for his last unit below b∗. This
implies that with positive probability l1 wins exactly one unit for a price b∗ when his valuation
for this unit is in (0, b∗) . Thus, there is at most one bidder who bids on his first unit at b∗ with
positive probability.
If no bidder were to bid with positive probability at b∗ on his first unit, then all bidders
would bid with positive probability at zero on their first unit. Hence, such bids would win with
positive probability. But it that case, bidders can gain from deviating to bidding their valuation.
Thus, there is exactly one bidder, say bidder i, who bids on his first unit at b∗ with positive
probability.
The remaining bidders must bid zero on all of the units for which their valuation is less than
b∗, for otherwise they run the risk of winning those units at prices above their valuations for
those units. As a consequence bidder i bids b∗ on all units for which his valuation is in the set
(0, b∗). 
Proof of Proposition 2: We have argued in the main text that these strategy profiles are
equilibria. It remains to show that there is no other equilibrium in which no bidder bids in
(0, vh) with positive probability.
Suppose that, with positive probability, the number of bids at or above vh is smaller than m.
Then there is a bidder who bids zero for some unit and wins this unit with positive probability
less than one. This bidder can raise his payoff by switching to always bidding his value.
Suppose that, with positive probability, the number of bids at or above vh is greater than
m. Then there exist a bidder who, with positive probability, wins one unit for a price greater or
equal vh. This bidder can raise his payoff by switching to always bidding his value.
This implies that the number of bids at or above vh is equal to m with probability one. Since
bids are independent across bidders, it follows that if bidder i bids at or above vh for his j - th
unit with positive probability, he must bid at or above vh for his j - th unit with probability
one. 
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